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     Chapter 14: 
Genetically Modified Rice, International Trade, and First-Mover 




During the last decade, a number of Asian countries have been actively developing programs of 
research on genetically modified (GM) crops (Runge and Ryan, 2004). Some of these countries 
have developed biosafety regulatory frameworks, but until now only a few have approved one 
or more GM crops. Empirical studies have shown that the introduction of Bt cotton in China 
and India have generated income gains for farmers overall (e.g., Bennett et al., 2004, Pray et al., 
2002). But these two countries only approved the large scale production of GM cotton, in part 
because unlike other GM crops, the main products of cotton are not used for food, and thus are 
not subject to food safety approval and labeling regulations in major importing countries. In 
particular,  neither  Japan  nor  the  European  Union  (EU)  directly  regulates  textile  products 
derived from GM cotton.  
In fact, most Asian countries that have invested in research and regulations on GM food 
crops are confronted with three possible alternatives: 1) allowing the production of GM food 
crops with the risk of losing potential exports, 2) rejecting the commercialization of any GM 
food crop, 3) producing both GM and non-GM food crops separately at a marketing cost. At the 
same  time,  they  have  to  take  into  account  the  potential  opportunity  cost  of  rejecting  the 
technology  when  other  competitors  adopt  it  (Elbehri  and  MacDonald,  2004;  Berwald  et  al., 
2006). In the last few years, China has been conducting field trials of different varieties of GM 
rice but has delayed a decision on its formal approval. At the same time, India has been actively 
conducting  public  research  on  GM  rice,  but  many  officials  appear  reluctant  to  see  its 
introduction.  India‘s  rice  exports  to  sensitive  markets  are  significant,  but  non-GM  rice 
segregation could help preserve its exports while allowing the rest of the country to use GM rice 
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to  increase  its  agricultural  productivity,  and  therefore  help  feed  a  large  and  fast-growing 
population.  
This  chapter  provides  an  integrated  ex-ante  economic  assessment  of  these  strategies 
focusing on the case of GM rice resistant to biotic and abiotic stresses in India with or without 
GM rice introduction in China. More specifically, this chapter has three main objectives. First, 
we  assess  the  impact  of  large  importers´  regulations  on  the  economic  effects  of  GM  rice 
adoption in India. Second, we evaluate the opportunity cost of GM/non-GM rice segregation 
under the external constraints previously defined. Third, we analyze the economic effects of 
GM rice adoption in India before or after China. In 2006, for the first time, India‘s total GM 
cotton  area  surpassed  China‘s  (James,  2006),  despite  the  fact  that  India  was  a  technology 
follower on Bt cotton. In this situation, it is relevant to ask whether India would gain or lose to 
jump ahead of China, and whether China would lose if India was a first-mover on GM rice. 
Our approach is based on a multi-sector, multi-country, computable general equilibrium 
(CGE)  model.  We  build  our  CGE  model  on  previous  studies  measuring  the  international 
economic  effects  associated  with  the  adoption  of  GM  crops  by  improving  the  productivity 
assumptions and the representation of trade related regulations of GM food. In particular, we 
derive  the  expected  effects  of  GM  rice  in  India  using  spatially  disaggregated  primary  and 
secondary  data  on  constraints  and  technology  potentials.  At  the  same  time,  we  use  the 
assumptions of Huang et al. (2004) to model the adoption of GM rice in China, which are also 
based on regionally disaggregated estimates of productivity effects. These assumptions help us 
estimate the economic effects of adopting GM rice in these two countries under specific trade 
regulations and derive the opportunity cost of segregation of GM and non-GM rice in India, 
with or without China‘s adoption of GM rice.  
The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we briefly review the literature. 
Then, we describe the methodology employed to derive productivity shifts with the adoption of 
GM rice in India. Following this, we explain the specificities of our trade model and present our 
scenarios. The results of the simulations are then presented and discussed.  Finally, we close the 
chapter with a few policy conclusions.  
Previous Literature on GM Rice and International trade 
Previous authors have used multi-country CGE models to simulate the introduction of GM 
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horizontal  linkages  in  the  economy  to  examine  the  effects  of  GM  technology  adoption  on 
multiple sectors and regions. The papers and approaches differ by their assumptions about the 
productivity effects of the technology, the rates of adoption, and according to the scenarios they 
choose  to  represent  trade  policies,  consumer  perceptions,  and  market  assumptions.  In  this 
section, we focus on the CGE studies measuring the effect of GM rice adoption in developing 
countries, and we compare the results they obtain for India and China.1 
Of the fourteen published CGE studies on GM crop introduction in  developing countries 
(Smale et  al.,  2006), only five studies  examine  the effects of GM rice introduction in Asian 
countries. Two studies analyze the global effect of GM rice adoption, two studies focus  on 
China, and one compares the effect of different GM rice varieties in eight  Asian  countries. 
Overall,  these  studies  use  similar  approaches  to  model ing  GM  rice  introduction,  with 
productivity shocks in the regions of adoption. But they use different vers ions of the GTAP 
database, different sector and regional desegregatio ns, and distinct assumptions concerning 
adoption rates, specific productivity effects and policies. We summarize the main differences in 
approach and assumptions and present the findings of these five studies in Table 1.  
First, Anderson, Jackson and Nielsen (2004) provide an analysis of GM rice and golden rice 
(nutritionally enhanced rice) adoption in multiple countries, using factor -biased productivity 
shifts and running various trade scenarios. Their results show that golden rice would provide a 
much bigger boost to countries adopting it than other types of GM rice due to its assumed effect 
on labor productivity in all sectors. They also show that a ban of GM products in Europe and 
selected Asian countries would result in large net losses globally, even if countries like China 
and India would only be affected marginally and would still gain from GM rice adoption.  
Anderson and Yao (2004) focus on China, and study the introduction of GM rice and 
cotton. They simulate the adoption of GM rice in North America, the Southern Cone of South 
America (Argentina, Uruguay, Chile), and South-East Asia with or without China. The results 
show that the global benefits with GM rice would double if China adopts it, with China‘s gains 
exceeding $1.1 billion per year. Two subsequent scenarios study the effects of GM food bans a) 
in Western Europe, and b) in Western Europe and North East Asia. The first case would reduce 
Chinese gains by $400 million while the second would divide by 3 the total welfare effects of 
                            
1 A few other studies use partial equilibrium modeling approaches to model the introduction of GM crops. For the 
case of drought resistant rice, see Annou, Fuller and Wailes (2005), with plausible productivity shocks, and a better 
representation of the global rice market, but without trade restrictions.  
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Table 1: Summary of Applied General Equilibrium Analyses of GM Rice Introduction 
Article 
GTAP version 
Productivity assumptions  GM rice adoption  Scenarios  Welfare effects 
Global  China  India 
Anderson, Jackson 
and Nielsen (2004) 
 
GTAP 5.4- 1997 
 
Factor-biased productivity gains: For 
non-golden GM rice: 6% land, 8% 
labor, 5% chemical input.  
For golden rice: 2% unskilled labor 
efficiency gains in all sectors. 
Other crops: 5% Hicks-neutral shifts. 
GM rice, coarse grains: 
45% in USA & Canada, 
30% in Argentina, 45% 
others (regular GM or 
golden rice). Oilseeds: 
75% in USA, Canada 
and Argentina 
a) China, South+ SE Asia 
adopt golden rice, Argentina, 
USA, Canada adopt GM 
oilseeds and coarse grains 
b) + ban in EU, Japan, Korea 
c) like a) with Bt rice 
d) same with coarse grains, 
oilseeds in Asia and ban of rice 



















Anderson and Yao 
(2004) 
GTAP 4-1995 
projected to 2005 
5% Hicks-neutral productivity shift 
in all adopting countries  
100% (implicit) in North 
America, South 
American Cone, South 
East Asia  
 GM rice Adoption 
a) Without China 














Huang et al. (2004) 
 
GTAP 5- 1997 
projected to 2001- 
2010 
Factor-biased productivity shifts: 
Dynamic changes in yields (from 6 
to 7.03%), dynamic changes in 
pesticide costs (-52 to -65%), labor 
costs (-7.2 to -9.1%) and constant 
seed cost premium (50%).  
Dynamic differentiation 
within China, national 
rate from 2% in 2002 to 
40% in 2005 and 95% in 
2010  
a) Progressive 
adoption of Bt rice in China 
from 2002 to 2010 
b) with ban in EU, Japan, 
Korea and SE Asia 




a) $4155m  
b)-5% in 
total gainsa  







GTAP 5.4- 1997 
 
5% Hicks neutral productivity shifts 
with GM rice or wheat in all 
adopting countries, 6% with 
oilseeds, 7.5% for coarse grains. 2% 
increase in all unskilled labor 
productivity with golden rice.  
GM rice, wheat, coarse 
grains: 45% in USA and 
Canada, 30% in 
Argentina, 45% in 
others (GM and golden 
rice).Oilseeds: 75% in 
USA, Canada & 
Argentina 
Selected scenarios: 
a) USA, Argentina, Canada, 
China and India adopt rice, 
wheat, coarse grains and 
oilseeds. 
b) same with EU moratorium 
















Hareau et al. (2005) 
 
GTAP model not 
specified 
Factor-biased shocks by trait and 
favorable and unfavorable land. 
Yield changed between 0 and 7.43%, 
for HT: seed cost (+15%) and labor 
cost (-15 to 30%) 
Full adoption of Bt rice, 
drought resistant rice, 
limited adoption of HT 
rice in eight countries of 
Asia  
Adoption of: 
a) Bt rice  
b) Drought resistant rice 
















Source: Cited references 
Note: a: In this case, total gains include GM rice and GM cotton adoption, and amount to $5,249m in 2010   
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GM crops. Overall the results show first that China would largely benefit from GM rice, and 
second, that as long as it keeps open access in the region it would largely benefit. Interestingly, 
the results for GM rice in India are negative, mostly because of a deterioration of its terms of 
trade with the price of rice declining.  
Huang et al. (2004) provide an assessment of the effects of Bt rice and Bt cotton introduction 
in China, with significant improvements in productivity assessment and regulatory effects, but 
without  explicitly  accounting  for  adoption  in  any  other  country.  They  use  dynamic  factor-
biased productivity shifts and adoption rates for GM rice. Their results show that China would 
gain about $4.3 billion at a 95% adoption rate from the use of Bt rice by 2010. Total gains with Bt 
rice and Bt cotton would only be reduced by 5% with a ban of GM rice in EU and OECD Asian 
countries. However they estimate that the introduction of GM food labeling could reduce the 
gains with Bt cotton and Bt rice by 25%.  
Anderson and Jackson (2005) study the effect of GM food crop adoption in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, including rice, but they also include the effect of GM rice adoption in India and China. 
They  vary  the  elasticity  of  substitution  between  GM  and non-GM  to account for  consumer 
aversion in OECD countries to all first-generation GM crops and increase consumer preference 
for golden rice in developing countries. They find that GM adopting countries largely benefit 
from GM rice and that trade restrictions are not significant compared to the potential gains for 
Sub-Saharan Africa. For India and China, they estimate that the gains from GM crop adoption 
would exceed $650 and $830 million, respectively, and they find that trade restrictions would 
not make much difference. 
 Lastly, Hareau et al. (2005) evaluate the effects of three different GM rice events (Bt rice 
resistant to stem borer, herbicide tolerant and drought tolerant) in eight countries of Asia. They 
use  factor-biased  productivity  shifts,  accounting  for  intra-national  differences  in  land  type, 
providing, therefore, a convincing approach to productivity modeling. Their results show that if 
the benefits of the three technologies are similar overall (over $2billion/year), the distribution of 
benefits highly depend on the particular trait and type of land. However they do not account 
for the possible effect of trade restrictions.  
To sum up, Table 1 shows there is a large variance in results across studies. For instance 
China would gain between $200 million and $4 billion by adopting non-golden GM rice. This 
variance  can  largely  be  explained  by  the  differences  in  assumptions,  particularly  on  
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productivity, but also by the modifications made to the model and differences in scenarios. At 
the same time, the effects of trade regulations on the benefits of GM rice seem to be relatively 
small for China. At the same time, India is used as a side country in four of the five studies, and 
there is an even larger variance in results for India across studies.  
In this chapter we build on previous analysis by proposing an incremental improvement in 
two regards. First, as explained in the next section, we provide regionally based productivity 
effects in the country we focus on (following Hareau et al., 2005; or Huang et al., 2004). Second, 
as explained later in the chapter, we provide a more complex representation of international 
market regulations with trade filters, selective trade bans and segregation. At the same time, we 
focus on GM rice adoption in India, a large country that has not been the focus of previous 
work in this area and we analyze the effect of its adoption of GM rice before or after China.  
Productivity Modeling 
We  model  GM  technology  introduction  with  factor-biased  productivity  shifts  in  three 
dimensions:  changes  in  yield,  chemical  use  and  labor  productivity,  using  spatially 
disaggregated  estimates  of  technology  potential  and  adoption  rates  combined  into  national 
aggregate  effects  of  technology  in  India.  We  also  use  expert  data  to  formulate  scenarios  of 
adoptions accounting for plausible differences across types of land and overtime. This overall 
process  is  intended  to  help  reduce  uncertainties  and  replace  what  may  appear  as  arbitrary 
productivity shifts by more consistent and plausible ones. In this section, we briefly explain the 
successive  steps  of  the  method  used  to  derive  our  assumed  productivity  shifts  in  the  four 
countries of study. 
Collection of Expert and Secondary Data on Constraints and Technology Potential:  We 
conducted a series of focus group meetings with scientific, agricultural and regulatory experts 
in  India  in  July  2005  on  the  potential  effects  of  biotechnology  improvements  providing 
resistance to biotic and abiotic stresses. In total, eight meetings were hold in five Indian cities 
(Delhi, Bombay, Bangalore, Hyderabad and Calcutta). In each of these meetings we discussed 
the  status  of  research,  agricultural  constraints  for  rice  and  other  crops,  the  potential  of 
biotechnology to address these constraints, and other issues related to regulatory approval and 
consumer acceptance of transgenic crops. We also asked the participants to these meetings to fill 
out questionnaires in order to elicit subjective estimates of potential yield and input effects of  
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future  new  technologies  (as  done  for  rice  in  Evenson  et  al.,  1996).  In  parallel,  we  obtained 
existing national studies of rice productivity constraints and technology potential.2  
Obtaining Range of Potential Technology Yield Effects in Affected Areas:3 We focus on 
four types of traits: insect resistance (more specifically Bt resistance to the stem borer), disease 
resistance  (bacterial  blight),  drought  resistance  and  salt  tolerance.  Each  GM  rice  variety  is 
modeled based on its effect on yields, use of chemical inputs (mainly pesticides), and its effect 
on labor. We would have liked to include the cost of seeds as a third factor, but we later realized 
that  we  did  not  have  relevant  data  to  incorporate  it  into  our  trade  model.  We  justify  the 
exclusion of seed premiums by choosing exogenous adoption rates that reflect partial adoption 
due to seed price differences. As a consequence, our results will be inclusive of the benefits of 
developers and not only producers (unlike Huang et al., 2004).  
Combining expert estimates on constraints and productivity potential and secondary data 
on yield constraints, we derived expected yield effects in rain fed versus irrigated land and in 
each water basin region of India.4 Triangular distributions of yield constraints (or yield gap) and 
of  the  potential  effects  of  using  transgenic  crops  from  the  questionnaires  and  meetings  are 
aggregated by taking the ―minmin‖ and ―maxmax‖ values and by averaging the most likely 
values (excluding clear outliers). We compute average ranges of potential effects by averaging 
over the most likely values of yield constraints (or yield gap) from different data sources, with 
the  minimum  and  maximum  values  retained.  The  ratio  of  expected  yield  effects  on  yield 
constraints  derived  from  experts‘  data  is  used  as  a  proxy  for  the  expected  efficacy  of  the 
technology. This efficacy rate is multiplied by the yield gap associated with the constraint to 
obtain the range of most likely yield effects of the technology.  
Affected Land and Production Type by Water Basin Projection:  The resulting yield effect 
is multiplied by the production share for each sub-region represented by a particular type of 
land (irrigated or rain fed) and water basin in India in order to obtain a weighted average of the 
total yield effects for India. To do so, we used 2015 projections of irrigated and rain fed areas by 
water basins in India from a baseline simulation of the IMPACT-Water model developed at the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). IMPACT-Water is a multi-market partial 
                            
2 The complete list of sources can be obtained from the authors. 
3 In this section, we focus on the derivations of the yield effect. The derivations of the input effects were mostly based 
on  a  combination  of  primary  and  secondary  data  per  crop/trait  combination,  but  did  not  involve  triangular 
distributions. 
4  In  this  subsection  we  describe  more  specifically  the  derivation  of  yield  effects,  for  which  we  use  triangular 
distributions, but our derivations of the input effects also follow the same general procedure.  
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equilibrium model of agricultural production and trade at the water basin level that projects the 
evolution of land and agriculture. The combination of yield effect by sub-region and share of 
each sub-region generates national average yield effects of each rice technology assuming a 
100% adoption rate. 
Figure 1: Spatial Drought Risk Indicator in India 
 
 
Source: IFPRI (2005) 
 
 
Figure 2: Salinity Risk Indicator in India 
 
 
Source: IFPRI (2005)  
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For the case of rice resistant to abiotic stresses, i.e. drought and salt tolerant rice, we also 
estimate the share of affected areas in each sub-region in order to account for the fact that not all 
land is affected by drought or soil salinity constraints. To do so, we used categorical indicators 
of drought and salinity constraints (see Figures 1 and 2) by areas of production, type of land, 
and water basin based on a satellite imagery and agricultural study developed by the spatial 
team of IFPRI.5The measure of drought is based on the annual variation (around a three decade 
average) of the length-of-growing-period computed for each of the 30 years from 1961-1990 
(Fischer  et  al.,  2002).  The  soil  salinity  index  is  based  on a  Fertility  Capability  Classification 
approach (Smith et al., 1998; Sanchez et al., 1982) applied to the mapping units of the FAO Soil 
Map of the World (FAO, 1995). The results allowed dividing the land into 10 types of categories 
of risk based on the share of saline land in each spatial unit. 
By filtering these indicators with production area in each spatial unit, we obtained  the 
share of affected areas in each sub-region. We then built categorical yield responses to the risk 
of drought or salinity. For instance, in the case of drought, the IFPRI spatial team was able to 
classify delimited areas of land in four categories: no risk, low risk, medium risk and high risk. 
We attributed probability of risk for each category (using a linear approximation) to obtain 
expected damage due to drought in a particular sub-region. The output is a weighted average of 
damage in each sub-region representing the national effect of abiotic stress resistant crops with 
a 100% adoption rate among producers affected.  
Adoption: Expert Data and Secondary Data on High Yield Varieties Adoption: In this 
study, we assume that producers in rain fed areas will not have the same adoption rate as 
producers in irrigated areas. Generally speaking, producers in irrigated areas tend to have a 
better access to new technologies, but at the same time, rain fed producers may benefit more 
from certain technologies.  
In addition, regional differences matter, and in a country like India, certain States tend to be 
the first to provide and adopt new technologies and have a higher proportion of technology 
adopters. To account for this fact, we corrected the production share of each Indian region by a 
proportional factor linked to historical data of the adoption of high yielding varieties of rice 
obtained from IndiaStat. Instead of assuming that a GM crop will be adopted in all regions the 
                            
5 The detailed mapping methodology, using an entropy approach to spatial disaggregation is explained in detail in 
You  and  Wood  (2006).  Abiotic  stress  indicators  were  developed  by  Liang  You,  Stan  Wood,  and  Cynthia  Rossi, 
following a methodology explained in detail in IFPRI (2005) for India.  
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same way, we let certain region be relatively larger adopters of the crop. The adoption rate in 
each sub-region is then multiplied by each yield and area factors to obtain a total expected yield 
effect of the technology in 2010, 2015 and 2020. 
Obtaining  Land  Type  Aggregate  Effect  and  National  Effects:    The  aggregate  national 
effect of the technology is computed with the following formula:  
(1)        


  . lt w lw lw lw
lw
α β σ y λ . 
 The subscript l stands for type of land: irrigated or rain fed, the subscript w for the water 
basin, and t for time; α is the exogenous adoption rate per type of land (for abiotic stress it 
represents  the  adoption  among  producer  affected)  and  period,  β  the  proportional  spatial 
correction of adoption rate based on observed rates of adoption of high yielding varieties in 
each water basin, σ is the share of production of the crop in the sub-region, y is the yield effect in 
each  sub-region, and λ is  the  share  of  production  under  rain  fed  or  irrigated  affected  by a 
specific abiotic stress. Fourteen water basins are used to represent India.  
 
Table 2: Absolute Productivity Effects and Initial Adoption assumed for India 
 
India  % Yield effects  % Input effects  % Adoption initial 
Technology  Min  ML  Max  Chemicals  Labor  IR  RF  Total 
DR Rice  0.30  2.58  6.69  0  0  24.55  18.4  22.43 
ST Rice  0.37  1.97  3.76  0  0  9.95  4.06  7.91 
Bt Rice  0.30  1.03  2.13  -9.5  -2.31  60  10  27.6 
VR Rice  0.11  0.43  0.87  -0.97  -0.4  30  5  13.8 
Source: Authors. Note: ML: most likely, DR: drought resistant, ST: salt tolerant, VR: virus/disease resistant, 
IR: irrigated, RF: rain fed 
 
Assumptions for the Major Technologies in India and China: The assumptions derived 
from this process for India are presented in absolute terms in Table 2. This table presents the 
assumed effects of each GM rice technology projected in 2015, which are the ones we use in our 
simulation model.6 The parameters presented in these tables include minimum, most likely and 
maximum value of the total yield effect, the total chemical effects, and the total labor effects at 
the  national  level  under  the  initial  adoption  rate  presented  in  the  last  three  columns.  For 
instance, the introduction of drought resistant rice in India (first row of Table 2) at an initial 
                            
6  We  also  derived  the  effects  and  adoption  for  each  crops  in  2010  and  2020,  but  we  did  not  use  them  in  the 
simulations presented in this chapter. We plan to use them later by adopting a dynamic modeling approach.  
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adoption rate of 22.43%, corresponding to 24.55% of irrigated land and 18.4% of rain fed land in 
2015 would most likely result in a 2.58% increase in total rice production in India. 
To translate these data into usable inputs in the multi-market, CGE model, we computed 
the  hypothetical  yield  and  input  effects  at  100%  adoption  level.  To  do  so,  we  divided  the 
estimated aggregate national effects by the estimated national adoption rates (computed as a 
weighted average of the adoption rate for irrigated and rain fed land). We then added the 
estimated aggregate national effects for each trait and divided them by the total adoption rate 
for each crop. These parameters are presented for reference in the first row of Table 3, but it is 
important to note that they are not necessarily meaningful, even if they are directly derived 
from estimated adoption and yield and input effects following the methodology described in 
this section. 7 In the case of China, in absence of primary data, we use the assumptions made by 
Huang et al. (2005) for 2010, while moderating the initial adoption rate. The parameters are 
shown in relative terms in the second row of Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Relative Productivity Effects and  
Initial Adoption Rates assumed for China and India  
Country  % Yield 
 effects 
% Input effects  % Adoption  
Chemicals  Labor   
India  8.38  -14.59  -3.78  71.74 
China*  7.03  -65  -9.1  80 
*Source: Huang et al. (2004) 
 
Trade Modeling and Scenarios 
A modified version of the MIRAGE model (Bchir et al., 2002) is used to simulate a range of 
scenarios on the productivity effect, trade restrictions and segregation options.8 This model is 
based on the GTAP 6.1 database, which represents the world as of 2001. For this application, we 
divide the economy into 21 regions, including GM producing countries, sensitive importing 
countries  and  other  important  countries,  and  19  sectors,  including  the  relevant  production 
sectors, as well as the chemical sector. The MIRAGE model includes an updated representation 
of trade policies and unilateral, bilateral and multilateral trade preferential agreements (using 
MAcMap-HS6; 2001 data).  
We  first  modify  the MIRAGE  model  by  dividing  the  rice  sector  into GM  and  non-GM 
                            
7 For example, it does not make sense to consider the effects of 100% national adoption of a drought resistant variety 
when the productivity effects of such variety will only be effective in 10% of the land. 
8 The MIRAGE model was developed at the Centre d‘Etudes Prospectives et d‘Informations Internationales (CEPII) 
in Paris. Full description of the model is available at the CEPII website (www.cepii.fr).  
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substitutes for all GM adopting countries. Second, with this structure, the model is changed to 
allow for the use of specific productivity shocks only on GM products in each GM sector for 
each  adopting  countries.  The  model  is  also  modified  to  allow  for  the  selective  ban  of  GM 
and/or non-GM imports going towards the final consumption in selected countries only from 
GM producing nations. This is done to reflect the current effects of labeling policies, which have 
allowed certain products to get into sensitive countries (animal feed in the EU, soy oil in Japan), 
but not others (Gruere, 2006). Furthermore, the model allows for blocking of imports from GM 
producing countries going towards both final and intermediate consumption of rice in certain 
scenarios. Lastly, the model is changed to allow for the introduction of a segregation cost for 
non-GM going from GM adopting countries to sensitive importing ones.  
To calibrate the model, we use the assumed parameters provided in the previous section 
regarding the productivity shocks and the proposed adoption rates. However because of the 
relative aggregated level of the chemical sector GTAP database, we make adjustments on the 
chemical input shock. In particular we reduce the productivity shock proportionally to account 
for the share of pesticide costs into the aggregated GTAP chemical sector for GM rice in the two 
adopting countries. More specifically, we use a two-step approach, first deriving the share of 
fertilizer in chemical use from FAOSTAT 2001, and secondly using general data on the share of 
insecticides in total pesticide use at the continental level (Yudelman et al., 1998).  
 After  this  data  adjustment,  under  each  set  of  scenarios,  the  model  is  calibrated  to 
incorporate the assumed productivity shock in the GM adopting nations. This process results in 
adaptation of the models to the productivity shock and adoption rates allowing the balance of 
factors and sectors in the economy as represented in the model. Then under each scenario, we 
run  the  model  only  once  to  simulate  a  comparative  static  shock  and  the  relevant  trade 
restrictions.  We  use  a  perfect  competition  representation  of  the  economy  for  simplification. 
Further  refinements  of  our  simulations  could  include  modeling  dynamics  and  imperfect 
competition. 
We define three distinct sets of scenarios. The first (Set C) only includes China as a GM rice 
adopter. In our consultation meetings, we found that Indian scientific and regulatory experts 
believe that India will only adopt GM rice if China adopts it first. The second (Set I) makes India 
the leading adopter of GM rice. The third (Set CI) represents the case of the adoption of GM rice  
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in the two countries. Each set of scenarios comprise eight individual scenarios, as shown in 
Table 4.  
Scenario  0  is  run  as  a  benchmark  without  GM  production.  Scenario  1  simulates  a 
productivity  shock  associated  with  the  adoption  of  GM  rice  and  no  trade  restriction,  i.e., 
assuming  all  countries  import  and  consume  GM  and  non-GM  rice  with  no  differentiation. 
Scenario 2 includes the same productivity shock with trade restrictions and no segregation. 
More specifically, we distinguish two sub-scenarios 2a and 2b. Sub-scenario 2a represents the 
short run effect of the adoption of unapproved GM rice varieties, namely the ban of GM and 
non-GM crops in sensitive countries. Sub-scenario 2b represents current trade restrictions on 
GM  imports  in  sensitive  countries.  Current  marketing  regulations,  private  standards  and 
consumer  reactions  act as  a  trade  filter.  Products  to  be  used  for  final consumption  are  not 
purchased or approved, but products for intermediate consumption (such as animal feed) are 
allowed because the final products are still used and are not necessarily subject to labeling 
requirements (e.g. meat in the EU, for more on labeling, see Gruere and Rao, 2007).  





shock on GM 
crops 




countriesa of  
Ban towards the 
final consumption 
in sensitive  
countriesa of 
Segregation of non-




Non-GM  GM   Non-GM  GM 
0. Base  No  No  No  No  No  No 
1. Productivity 
shock 
Yes  No  No  No  No  No 
2a. Import ban, 
no segregation  




Yes  No  No 
Yes 




Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
3a-ii. Import 
ban, 5% cost 
segregation  




Yes  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
3b-ii. Import 
filter, 5% cost 
segregation  
Yes  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Note: a :The sensitive countries are the European Union, Rest of Europe, Japan, South  Korea and Australia-New 
Zealand  
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Lastly,  scenario  3  allows  for  the  segregation  of  non-GM  exports  from  GM  adopting 
countries  to  sensitive  importing  countries.  Three  sub-scenarios  are  proposed  to  study  the 
implication of different segregation costs and types of trade restrictions; 3a-i is ran with costless 
segregation (as a benchmark) but ban of GM in final and intermediate consumption of sensitive 
countries (based on scenario a), 3a-ii is the same with a 5% basic segregation cost, 3b-i is based 
on scenario 2b with costless segregation of non-GM, and 3b-ii adds a 5% segregation cost.  
 
Results 
We present the results in terms of welfare effects, defined as the equivalent variation (or real 
income) between each scenario and the base (0) for each set. Both absolute values in millions of 
dollars and percentage of total real income per year are shown for each region in each scenario. 
We also provide additional data on production, imports, exports and prices in the Appendix 
(see Tables A1, A2, A3, and A4) to explain the results.9 
Set C: Table 5 shows the results for the Set C. In this case, China is the only country to 
adopt GM rice. The United States approved the use of herbicide tolerant rice in 2006, but it is 
not cultivated because of fears of export losses. Iran has reportedly approved the cultivation of 
Bt rice, and could be the only country producing GM rice at a small scale (James, 2006). We 
decided to neglect limited potential GM rice production in these two countries, in order to 
isolate  the  shock  with  the  adoption  of  GM  rice  in  China  (and/or  India  in  other  sets).  It  is 
commonly believed that GM rice will be available in world markets only if it is first released in 
China. 
The productivity shock generates global welfare gains exceeding $5.6 billion, most of which 
are attributed to China ($4.6 billion). The introduction of an import ban in sensitive countries 
(scenario 2a) reduces global gains by about $1.3 billion, most of which is due to a reduction in 
welfare gains in these particular countries. In contrast, an import filter in sensitive countries 
reduces global gains by only $300 million. This means that, with the adoption of GM rice, rice 
exports from China to sensitive countries will be more largely directed towards intermediate 
than towards final consumption. The introduction of segregation with an import ban (scenarios 
3a-i and 3a-ii) results in significant increases in global gains (from $460 to 600million), even with 
                            
9 The price indicator can be misleading since it is just a weighted average of numerous price evolutions which does 
not reflect well the eventual  unequal distribution of prices. MIRAGE export prices are determined by products, 
country of origin, and country of destination and there is no single world price for a commodity.  
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Table 5: Change in Welfare Effects under Each Scenario with GM Rice Adoption in China ($ million/year and % total) 






















Region  $ million  %  $ million  %  $ million  % $ million  % $ million  %  $ million  % $ million  % 
Australia and New Zealand  -3.931 -0.001  -1.964 -0.001  -3.781 -0.001  -2.958  -0.001  -2.840  -0.001  -3.881  -0.001  -3.860  -0.001 
China  4631.580  0.596  4607.905  0.593  4623.713  0.595 4617.701  0.594  4615.728  0.594  4626.803  0.596  4625.692  0.595 
Japan  441.544  0.014  -293.716 -0.010  155.614  0.005  36.312  0.001  -31.578  -0.001  281.734  0.009  232.040  0.008 
South Korea  171.091  0.059  -154.111 -0.053  146.833  0.051  8.038  0.003  -23.123  -0.008  158.080  0.055  142.878  0.049 
Rest of Asia  13.547  0.002  13.498  0.002  14.202  0.003  13.362  0.002  14.062  0.003  13.878  0.002  14.450  0.003 
Indonesia  2.728  0.003  3.146  0.003  2.810  0.003  2.945  0.003  3.012  0.003  2.771  0.003  2.820  0.003 
Philippines  3.910  0.006  3.004  0.005  3.698  0.006  3.424  0.005  3.313  0.005  3.792  0.006  3.719  0.006 
Bangladesh  0.457  0.001  0.304  0.001  0.437  0.001  0.376  0.001  0.420  0.001  0.446  0.001  0.492  0.001 
India  -0.195  0.000  0.543  0.000  -0.032  0.000  0.212  0.000  -1.431  0.000  -0.105  0.000  -1.620  0.000 
Canada  6.015  0.001  6.311  0.001  6.159  0.001  6.169  0.001  6.227  0.001  6.091  0.001  6.141  0.001 
United States  73.624  0.001  74.402  0.001  74.761  0.001  73.979  0.001  73.609  0.001  74.251  0.001  73.925  0.001 
Mexico  3.161  0.001  2.498  0.001  3.006  0.001  2.807  0.001  2.721  0.001  3.074  0.001  3.016  0.001 
Rest of Latin America  28.967  0.006  31.867  0.006  29.828  0.006  30.523  0.006  30.964  0.006  29.441  0.006  29.742  0.006 
Argentina  -0.051  0.000  0.172  0.000  -0.030  0.000  0.070  0.000  0.092  0.000  -0.041  0.000  -0.029  0.000 
Brazil  -0.140  0.000  0.033  0.000  -0.083  0.000  -0.040  0.000  -0.010  0.000  -0.109  0.000  -0.083  0.000 
European Union  206.655  0.003  -0.406  0.000  129.536  0.002  89.921  0.001  53.499  0.001  162.154  0.003  134.016  0.002 
Rest of Europe  26.825  0.004  9.708  0.001  18.455  0.003  17.123  0.003  15.109  0.002  22.058  0.003  20.404  0.003 
North Africa and Middle East  31.349  0.004  29.892  0.004  31.380  0.004  30.521  0.004  30.573  0.004  31.354  0.004  31.470  0.004 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  46.272  0.029  45.449  0.028  46.267  0.029  45.771  0.028  45.724  0.028  46.258  0.029  46.248  0.029 
South Africa  1.491  0.002  1.334  0.002  1.489  0.002  1.411  0.002  1.388  0.002  1.490  0.002  1.477  0.002 
Tanzania and Uganda  0.553  0.004  0.496  0.004  0.548  0.004  0.521  0.004  0.520  0.004  0.550  0.004  0.551  0.004 
World  5685.449  0.023  4380.366  0.018  5284.807  0.022 4978.186  0.020  4837.978  0.020  5460.087  0.022  5363.487  0.022 
Source: Authors‘ results from simulations    
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a  5%  cost  of  segregation.  Similar  relative  compensating  welfare  effects  are  observed  with 
costless  or  costly  segregation  scenarios  based  on  import  filters  (3b-i  and  3b-ii).  Costly 
segregation scenarios (at 5%) result in a small decline in global welfare compared to costless 
segregation, mainly because of a reduction in welfare gains in sensitive countries largely due to, 
the increase in import prices they face. 
Therefore, at the global level, one can conclude that the introduction of GM rice would 
result in gains of about $5billion/year, most of which would go to China. Trade restrictions in 
sensitive countries in the short run (ban) would result in reduced global gains, mostly because 
of smaller gains in these importing countries. Trade restriction in sensitive countries in the long 
run (filter) would result in much smaller reductions in welfare gains. Segregation of non-GM 
rice can help compensate for trade losses. Costly segregation leads to market segmentation and 
a price increase for rice imports in sensitive countries. 
China‘s gains are almost identical across scenarios, ranging from $4608 to $4631 million 
annually.  The  decomposition  of  welfare  (Table  A1)  shows  that  China  only  receives  small 
allocative efficiency gains and terms of trade gains. Most of its welfare gains come from other 
sources,  including  technical  gains.10  With  the  introduction  of  GM  rice  (scenario  1),  China 
increases its production by 20%, increases its exports by 27% and reduces its imports by 47%, 
but these relative changes vary across scenarios. In particular, under trade restriction and no 
segregation (scenarios 2a and 2b), China does neither produces nor exports as much, which may 
explain its reduction in total gains. In fact with an import ban on rice in sensitive countries, 
China exports 12% less rice than in the base. In contrast, when adding segregation to an import 
ban, China exports much more rice than in the base (40 to 60%), mostly non-GM rice going 
towards  sensitive  countries,  as  it  is  taking  advantage  of  a  good  price  for  non-GM.  As  a 
consequence, whether costly or costless, segregation helps in offsetting the relative reduction in 
welfare gains with a trade ban. In the long run, assuming sensitive countries‘ regulations act as 
trade filters allowing intermediate consumption, segregation also provides small relative gains 
to China even at 5% additional costs; in particular, the production of rice reaches +20% with 
lower export increases. 
In Set C, India is not producing GM rice. As a rice exporter to sensitive countries, India 
would lose about $0.2 million/yr from the free adoption of GM rice in China. Results show that 
                            
10 In the three sets, the welfare decomposition does not change significantly across scenarios.    
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India produces only a little less and exports 5.7% less rice in scenario 1 (Table A3). With a trade 
ban or trade filter on GM rice in sensitive countries, India‘s gains or losses are insignificant. 
India incurs slightly larger losses with costly segregation in sensitive countries, as its total rice 
exports decline by 8 to 9% compared to the base. India obtains small gains under the total ban 
scenario  (2a),  probably  gaining  market  shares.  Overall,  none  of  the  effects  of  GM  rice 
introduction in China is significant in terms of India‘s total real income. In fact, other countries 
are more affected than India by China‘s adoption of GM rice. In relative terms, the largest 
average gains occur in Sub-Saharan Africa, a region that imports rice. South Korea gains more 
in relative terms for the three scenarios with trade filters than with trade bans, as it imports 
some rice for intermediate consumption from China. Only two regions experience small losses 
across all scenarios, Australia-New Zealand, a small competitor, and Brazil, but as with India, 
these losses are insignificant in relative terms. 
Set I: In the second set, India is the only producer of GM rice. This more hypothetical 
scenario  helps  to  isolate  the  effect  of  GM  rice  adoption  under  trade  restrictions  in  India. 
Moreover, it provides an insight into the effect of India preceding China in adopting GM rice. 
The welfare results of this set of scenarios are provided in Table 6. Global welfare gains exceed 
$3.5 billion annually. The almost entire gains occur in India ($3.2 b). Global gains are highest in 
scenario 1, with only productivity shocks. Trade restrictions in sensitive countries reduce the 
overall  gains  by  about  2  to  6%.  The  use  of  costless  segregation  partially  compensates  this 
relative reduction in gains for both trade ban and trade filter. But with 5% costs of segregation, 
global  welfare  gains  decline  to  a  lower  level  than  the  ones  with  trade  restrictions  and  no 
segregation.  Therefore,  it  is  clear  that,  if  India  is  the  only  adopter  of  GM  rice,  the  cost  of 
segregation, rather than the type of restriction, is an important factor in the outcome. 
India gains over $3.25 billion in real income with GM rice adoption. Although these gains 
are smaller than the one in China in Set C, they are larger in relative terms. Most of these gains 
come from improvements in technical and allocative efficiency (Table A1). As an important 
exporter, the adoption of GM rice in India results in a larger drop in average world price than in 
the case of China (-0.8% instead of -0.6% in Set C), which may partially explain the small drop in 
India‘s terms of trade (-0.01% of total real income). Because India is exporting a significant share 
of rice towards sensitive countries, trade restrictions affect its outcome relatively more than 
China in Set C, but these reductions still remain quite small in absolute terms (about $21 million    
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Table 6: Change in Welfare Effects ($ million/yr and % total) under each Scenario with GM Rice Adoption in India 






















Region  $ million  % $ million  %  $ million  % $ million  % $ million  %  $ million  % $ million  % 
Australia and New Zealand  -1.184  0.000  -1.720 -0.001  -1.685 -0.001  -1.438  0.000  -1.300  0.000  -1.417  0.000  -1.287  0.000 
China  5.042  0.001  4.740  0.001  4.902  0.001  4.892  0.001  2.895  0.000  4.973  0.001  3.055  0.000 
Japan  33.837  0.001  6.421  0.000  23.799  0.001  20.369  0.001  -57.507  -0.002  28.845  0.001  -48.126  -0.002 
South Korea  8.815  0.003  0.233  0.000  8.095  0.003  4.562  0.002  -29.519  -0.010  8.452  0.003  -25.027  -0.009 
Rest of Asia  -14.421 -0.003  -8.695 -0.002  -12.887 -0.002  -11.992  -0.002  -11.360  -0.002  -13.742  -0.002  -13.395  -0.002 
Indonesia  5.883  0.006  6.186  0.006  5.945  0.006  6.008  0.006  6.081  0.006  5.909  0.006  5.968  0.006 
Philippines  1.849  0.003  1.597  0.003  1.790  0.003  1.737  0.003  1.615  0.003  1.822  0.003  1.714  0.003 
Bangladesh  2.904  0.008  3.372  0.009  3.069  0.008  3.101  0.008  3.137  0.008  2.976  0.008  2.996  0.008 
India  3262.894  0.875  3243.777  0.870  3256.189  0.873 3254.683  0.873  3253.050  0.872  3259.908  0.874  3258.959  0.874 
Canada  2.682  0.001  2.915  0.001  2.775  0.001  2.776  0.001  2.839  0.001  2.722  0.001  2.776  0.001 
United States  23.573  0.000  20.031  0.000  22.905  0.000  22.000  0.000  21.769  0.000  23.267  0.000  23.183  0.000 
Mexico  1.530  0.000  1.317  0.000  1.471  0.000  1.433  0.000  1.333  0.000  1.502  0.000  1.412  0.000 
Rest of Latin America  -0.471  0.000  1.143  0.000  -0.098  0.000  0.205  0.000  0.667  0.000  -0.308  0.000  0.059  0.000 
Argentina  -1.519 -0.001  -1.461 -0.001  -1.557 -0.001  -1.490  -0.001  -1.462  -0.001  -1.536  -0.001  -1.514  -0.001 
Brazil  -0.728  0.000  -0.523  0.000  -0.686  0.000  -0.636  0.000  -0.609  0.000  -0.709  0.000  -0.690  0.000 
European Union  114.210  0.002  -42.832 -0.001  50.905  0.001  43.686  0.001  5.022  0.000  85.108  0.001  52.245  0.001 
Rest of Europe  7.904  0.001  3.103  0.000  5.773  0.001  5.639  0.001  3.375  0.001  6.896  0.001  4.745  0.001 
North Africa and Middle East  68.884  0.009  70.764  0.009  69.755  0.009  69.596  0.009  69.646  0.009  69.247  0.009  69.245  0.009 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  28.929  0.018  29.263  0.018  29.244  0.018  29.027  0.018  28.957  0.018  29.059  0.018  28.989  0.018 
South Africa  11.214  0.013  11.209  0.013  11.221  0.013  11.201  0.013  11.190  0.013  11.214  0.013  11.204  0.013 
Tanzania and Uganda  0.951  0.007  0.991  0.007  0.970  0.007  0.966  0.007  0.965  0.007  0.959  0.007  0.956  0.007 
World  3562.778  0.015  3351.829  0.014  3481.894  0.014 3466.325  0.014  3310.781  0.014  3525.148  0.014  3377.465  0.014 
Source: Authors‘ results from simulations  
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or  0.6%  of  total  gains with  trade  ban  compared  to  scenario  1).  With  GM  rice,  India 
increases its production by about 20% and reduces its imports by over 50% (Table A4). 
Changes  in  rice  exports  vary  across  scenarios,  from  +  17.7%  in  the  most  restrictive 
scenarios 2a and 2b to +26% in scenario 1 and +39% in scenario 3a-i. 
In the short run, with sensitive countries banning all rice imports from India, India 
still gains over $3.243 billion annually. Segregation of non-GM rice can increase these 
gains by a small amount ($10 million), even with 5% costs. With segregation, Indian rice 
exports would increase by over 30% compared with the base scenario with no GM rice, 
most of which will be non-GM rice going towards sensitive countries because of the 
better price they can fetch there. 
In the long run, with trade filters in sensitive countries, the same pattern occurs on a 
smaller  scale.  A  trade filter  reduces  the  gains  to  India  by $7  million/year,  of which 
costless segregation compensates $3 million/year, thanks to an increase of rice export by 
about 12% relative to the base. India can still benefit from segregation with 5% costs, 
increasing its exports by 5% and obtaining an additional $2 million/year compared to 
no segregation.  
In  Set  I,  China  does  not  adopt  GM  rice,  despite  being  more  advanced  in  the 
technology. China has been testing GM rice in the field for the last few years, yet it still 
has  not  decided  to  approve  or  reject  its  commercialization.  Results  for  this  set  of 
scenarios show that, if India becomes a technology leader through introducing GM rice, 
China would not lose in welfare overall. In fact it would gain a very small amount ($3-5 
million annually). The main consequence of India‘s adoption of GM rice is a reduction of 
Chinese rice exports by 4 to 12%. Rice production in China decreases by an insignificant 
amount,  while  imports  increase  by  about  1%.  The  welfare  results  do  not  change 
significantly across scenarios, even if the segregation for Indian rice with 5% costs would 
result in slightly smaller gains. 
Among other countries, the largest relative gains occur in the Rest of Sub-Saharan 
Africa  and  South  Africa.  Because  of  the  increased  competitiveness  of  India  and  the 
decline  in  average  prices,  exporters  like  the  Rest  of  Asia (the  leading  rice  exporting 
region), Argentina, Australia and Brazil consistently incur losses across scenarios, even 
if all losses are very small in relative terms. Sensitive Asian importers lose with costly  
Gruère et al.         Chap.14: Genetically Modified Rice     319      
 
China's Agricultural Trade: Issues and Prospects 
 
segregation schemes and account for a large share of the differences in global gains 
across scenarios. 
Set CI:  The results for the Set CI, with GM rice introduction in China and India, are 
presented in Table 7. Global gains amount to a little less that the addition of the two 
amounts obtained in the previous sets, reaching $9.2 billion under scenario 1. These 
gains vary between $7.7 and 9 billion across scenarios with trade restrictions. As in the 
previous  cases,  most  of  the  gain  occurs  in  countries  adopting  GM  rice,  but  the 
differences  across  scenarios  are  mostly  due  to  the  variation  of  welfare  in  sensitive 
countries.  Trade  ban  and  trade  filter  for  rice  produced  in  China  and  India  without 
segregation  result  in  a  reduction  of  global  gains  by  16  and  7%,  respectively.  The 
difference  between  the  two  demonstrates  once  again  the  relative  importance  of  rice 
going  from  China  and  India  towards  the  intermediate  consumption  of  sensitive 
countries. In the short run, segregation would help recuperate 38 to 48% of the welfare 
gain reduction due to a trade ban. In the long run, segregation of non-GM rice for final 
consumption increases global gains by an insignificant amount in relative terms, but still 
compensating for 27 to 46% of the reduction in global gains with trade filters.  
China gains $4.6 billion annually (corresponding to 0.6% of total real income) from 
introducing  GM  rice,  an  amount  almost  identical  to  the  one  obtained  in  Set  C.  The 
decomposition of welfare is exactly the same as the one in Set C. Therefore, the adoption 
of GM rice in India does not result in any significant loss for China, even if the average 
price index of rice decreases by over 1.3% instead of 0.5% compared to the base. Overall, 
China increases its rice production by 18 to 20%, and decreases its imports by over 46% 
(Table  A5).  China‘s  exports  changes  vary  across  scenarios,  contributing  to  the  small 
changes in welfare. In the short run, a ban of rice in sensitive countries results in an 
increase of Chinese rice exports by 8% compared to 21% in scenario 1, but the reduction 
of total welfare gains is still limited to about $34 million/year. Segregation of non-GM 
rice translates into relatively less rice production and a large relative increase in rice 
exports  (up  to  51%  compared  to  the  base),  mostly  of non-GM  rice  directed  towards 
sensitive countries. Costly segregation slightly reduces the non-GM exports but is still 
beneficial  compared  to  no  segregation.  In  the  long  run,  applying  a  trade  filter  in 
sensitive countries, results in a similar increase of exports of 7%. Segregation of non-GM  
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rice partially compensates for the small reduction in welfare gains, and is translated by 
export increases up to 30% compared to the base. Most of these exports are non-GM rice 
going towards sensitive countries. 
In average, India gains $3.253 billion annually (or 0.872% of total real income) with 
the adoption of GM rice, a total only remotely inferior to the one with India adopting 
alone ($3 million lower). The decomposition of welfare remains the same, with a small 
loss in terms of trade, but relative technical and allocative efficiency gains (Table A1). 
India increases its production of rice by 16 to 20%, and its imports decrease by over 51%. 
Like China, changes in exports vary across scenarios. In the short run, a trade ban in 
sensitive  countries  results  in  a  loss  of  $18  million/year.  Segregation  of  non-GM  rice 
towards  sensitive  countries  provides  a  significant  compensation  (around 
$11million/year), based on a relative large increase in exports of non-GM rice towards 
sensitive countries. In the long run, import filters in sensitive countries only result in a 
reduction of gains by $6 million per year compared to scenario 1. With segregation, 
India regains about $3-4 million, thanks to increased exports of non-GM rice towards 
sensitive countries.  
Among  other  countries,  African  countries  are  the  only  one  with  consistent  and 
relatively significant gains with the adoption of GM rice in India and China because of 
the price decrease. Australia-New Zealand, Argentina, and Brazil incur small losses, as 
rice exporters. At the same time, the largest rice exporters, located in the Rest of Asia 
region, do not incur net welfare losses, but obtain insignificant gains despite reducing 
their production of rice by about 2% and their exports of rice by more than 13%. Brazil, 
Bangladesh,  Indonesia  and  the  Philippines  increase  their  total  rice  imports  in  all 
scenarios,  therefore  contributing  to  the  absorption  of  the  rice  production  increase  in 
India and China. The three Asian countries in this group obtain small gains overall, 
while Brazil incurs losses.  
Lastly, the results for sensitive importers vary largely across scenarios. Japan, South 
Korea and the EU import more rice in the scenarios with a GM ban and segregation, but 
not in other scenarios. Apart from Australia and New Zealand, only Japan and South 
Korea lose with GM rice under scenario 3a-ii, with a 5% segregation cost and ban of GM   
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Table 7: Change in Welfare Effects ($ million/yr and % total) under each Scenario with GM rice Adoption in China and India 






















Region  $ million  % $ million  %  $ million  % $ million  % $ million  %  $ million  % $ million  % 
Australia and New Zealand  -4.959 -0.002  -3.528 -0.001  -5.313 -0.002  -4.276  -0.001  -4.151  -0.001  -5.146  -0.002  -5.119  -0.002 
China  4633.467  0.596  4609.906  0.593  4625.684  0.595 4620.240  0.595  4618.276  0.594  4628.876  0.596  4627.751  0.596 
Japan  472.340  0.015  -288.651 -0.009  177.276  0.006  56.301  0.002  -11.778  0.000  308.451  0.010  259.205  0.009 
South Korea  178.413  0.062  -155.699 -0.054  153.534  0.053  12.564  0.004  -18.638  -0.006  165.156  0.057  150.179  0.052 
Rest of Asia  1.535  0.000  7.360  0.001  3.657  0.001  3.275  0.001  3.962  0.001  2.404  0.000  2.774  0.001 
Indonesia  8.500  0.009  9.222  0.009  8.640  0.009  8.828  0.009  8.902  0.009  8.566  0.009  8.611  0.009 
Philippines  5.656  0.009  4.481  0.007  5.384  0.009  5.081  0.008  4.968  0.008  5.517  0.009  5.451  0.009 
Bangladesh  3.382  0.009  3.701  0.010  3.525  0.009  3.482  0.009  3.519  0.009  3.438  0.009  3.464  0.009 
India  3258.841  0.874  3240.650  0.869  3252.511  0.872 3251.964  0.872  3250.333  0.872  3256.246  0.873  3255.276  0.873 
Canada  8.600  0.002  9.141  0.002  8.836  0.002  8.838  0.002  8.892  0.002  8.712  0.002  8.751  0.002 
United States  95.934  0.001  93.177  0.001  96.403  0.001  94.832  0.001  94.521  0.001  96.258  0.001  96.111  0.001 
Mexico  4.630  0.001  3.751  0.001  4.417  0.001  4.199  0.001  4.113  0.001  4.520  0.001  4.470  0.001 
Rest of Latin America  28.646  0.006  33.228  0.007  29.851  0.006  30.680  0.006  31.146  0.006  29.229  0.006  29.495  0.006 
Argentina  -1.495 -0.001  -1.215 -0.001  -1.512 -0.001  -1.355  -0.001  -1.326  -0.001  -1.501  -0.001  -1.487  -0.001 
Brazil  -0.849  0.000  -0.472  0.000  -0.751  0.000  -0.664  0.000  -0.626  0.000  -0.799  0.000  -0.773  0.000 
European Union  307.302  0.005  -57.166 -0.001  169.191  0.003  132.836  0.002  95.083  0.001  238.249  0.004  212.788  0.003 
Rest of Europe  34.453  0.005  12.609  0.002  23.994  0.004  22.683  0.003  20.641  0.003  28.763  0.004  27.174  0.004 
North Africa and Middle East  97.697  0.012  98.229  0.012  98.599  0.012  97.591  0.012  97.676  0.012  98.047  0.012  98.143  0.012 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  72.242  0.045  71.811  0.044  72.541  0.045  71.872  0.045  71.844  0.044  72.348  0.045  72.351  0.045 
South Africa  12.611  0.014  12.464  0.014  12.619  0.014  12.529  0.014  12.517  0.014  12.611  0.014  12.608  0.014 
Tanzania and Uganda  1.482  0.011  1.468  0.011  1.496  0.011  1.465  0.011  1.465  0.011  1.487  0.011  1.487  0.011 
World  9218.428  0.038  7704.465  0.031  8740.582  0.036 8432.964  0.034  8291.338  0.034  8961.429  0.036  8868.709  0.036 
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rice. Therefore, in most cases, sensitive countries gain overall from the adoption of GM 
rice. 
Discussion 
The  results  of  our  international  economy-wide  simulations  vary  across  regions  and 
scenarios, but they share a number of similarities, that can help us draw a few general 
lessons. First, our simulations show that the adoption of GM rice by India and/or China 
would  result  in  significant  economic  gains  in  these  countries  and  globally  in  the 
presence  or  absence  of  trade  restrictions  in  certain  sensitive  countries.  Only  a  few 
regions  experience  net  losses  with  the  adoption  of  GM  rice,  and  these  losses  are 
relatively insignificant, except perhaps in sensitive countries with trade bans or when 
segregation  results  in  a  5%  additional  trade  cost  for  their  non-GM  rice  imports. 
However, these developed countries have adopted restrictive policies in the presence of 
positive consumer willingness to pay to avoid GM food products, so these relatively 
small real income losses might not be actual welfare losses. At the same time, under our 
assumptions,  the  model  shows  that  adopting  GM  rice  in  China  and  India  results  in 
significant economic gains, based on technical efficiency gains, and associated with large 
increases in rice production and large reduction of imports. 
 
Table 8: Relative Effects of Trade Restriction on Total Gains from GM Rice 
Adoption for Selected Countries in the Three Sets of Scenarios 
Set  C  I  CI 
Scenarios  1 vs. 2a  1 vs. 2b  1 vs. 2a  1 vs. 2b  1 vs. 2a  1 vs. 2b 
China  0.51%  0.17%      0.51%  0.17% 
India      0.59%  0.21%  0.56%  0.19% 
World  23%  7.0%  5.9%  2.3%  16.4%  5.2% 
Source: Simulation results 
 
Secondly, our simulations show that trade regulations would affect the gains from 
GM rice adoption, but that this effect is insignificant compared to the gains with the 
adoption of GM rice. A complete import ban of rice from GM producing countries in 
sensitive countries results in lower gains for an exporter like India. Similarly, applying a 
trade filter that allows only products for intermediate consumption to enter sensitive 
countries,  reflecting  the  effects  of  current  labeling  regulations  on  GM  food,  slightly 
reduces the gains of exporting GM adopting countries. Yet, even with these barriers, 
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loss  with  trade  restrictions  is  very  small  compared  to  the  productivity  gains  they 
experience domestically. To emphasize this result, Table 8 shows the relative change in 
gains from GM rice under the most restrictive scenarios of each set. Even if globally, the 
gains are reduced by up to 23% overall (in the first set), we find that the reduction in 
gains for India or China is less or equal to 0.6% of the overall gains they obtain with GM 
rice. This means that for each 100 dollars of real income gains with GM rice, China or 
India would risk losing 60 cents due to the possible ban in import-sensitive countries. 
 
Table 9: Opportunity Cost of Segregation of non-GM Rice for Adopting and 
Sensitive Countries ($ million/year)  
$million/year  Country  Segregation of non-GM rice 
for final consumption only  
Segregation of non-GM rice 
for final and intermediate  
consumption 
SET  C  I  CI  C  I  CI 
  China  3.1  0.1  2.9  9.8  0.2  10.3 
  India  -0.1  3.7  3.7  -0.3  10.9  11.3 
Total GM producers  3.1  3.7  6.6  9.8  10.9  21.6 
  Australia-NZ  -0.1  0.3  0.2  -1  0.3  -0.8 
  Japan  126.1  5.0  131.2  330  14  345 
  South Korea  11.3  0.4  11.6  162.2  4.3  168.3 
  EU  32.6  34.2  69.1  90.3  86.5  190 
  Rest of 
Europe  3.6  1.1  4.8  7.4  2.5  10 
Total sensitive countries  173.5  41  216.9  588.9  107.6  712.5 
Global  175.3  43.3  220.9  597.8  114.5  728.5 
Source: Authors‘ derivations 
Thirdly,  the  use  of  segregation for  non-GM  crops  can help  offset  some  of  these 
relatively  minor  losses  for  GM  rice  adopters,  even  at  a  5%  costs.  Estimates  of  the 
opportunity costs of segregation are reported for selected countries in Table 9. We can 
draw  several  conclusions  from  these  derivations.  First,  these  results  show  that  GM 
producing  countries  have  a  positive  but  relatively  limited  opportunity  cost  of 
segregation, ranging from $3 to 4million/year for final rice product to about $7 million 
per year for rice going towards intermediate consumption. Second, segregation would 
be as valuable for China as for India, even if segregation would be globally much more 
valuable  when  China  adopts  than  when  India  adopts  GM  rice.  Third,  we  find  that 
segregation  of  non-GM  rice  for  intermediate  consumption  would  matter  more  than 
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More generally, we find that most of the global benefits of segregation would occur 
in importing sensitive countries themselves. For instance, when the two countries adopt 
GM rice, segregating non-GM rice for final consumption results in global gains of $221 
million per year, of which $217 million would occur in sensitive countries and only $6.6 
million in China and India. Similarly, under the same set, the segregation of non-GM 
rice for final and intermediate consumption results in increased gains of about $728m 
per year, of which $712 million would go to sensitive countries and only $21 million to 
GM rice adopters. Consequently, these results suggest that the adoption of GM rice in 
India or China may not necessarily require high investment by traders willing to keep 
their market in sensitive countries. Because the immediate cost of bans will largely be 
borne by importers, they will have a clear incentive to invest in segregation or at least to 
make sure GM rice is approved and the import bans are replaced by trade filters. 
Fourth, we find that India and China can act independently on GM rice, because 
they  do  not  share  competing  interests.  The gains  to  China  remain  the  same if  India 
adopts GM rice or if it does not, despite the relative price decline with both countries 
adopting. Similarly, the gains to India remain the same, whether China adopts or not. 
But  the  order  of  leadership  makes  a  small  difference.  If  China  leads  the  world  by 
adopting GM rice, India would incur very small losses in rice export, and suffer a small 
and relatively insignificant decline in real income if it does not follow China. On the 
other  hand,  if  India  adopts  GM  rice  first,  China  would  actually  gain  a  small  and 
relatively insignificant welfare amount, even if it slightly reduces its exports of rice. We 
would expect the same type of effect with other net exporting or small exporting and 
importing  countries:  large  exporters  will  loss  from  a  rival  adopting  a  productivity 
enhancing technology, while small exporters and importers will not necessarily lose and 
may even gain from it.  
 Overall, we obtain larger gains for GM rice in India or globally than previous studies. 
For China, our results can be compared to the ones of Huang et al. (2004). Our slightly 
larger  results  likely  come  from  the  fact  that  unlike  Huang  et  al.  (2004),  we  do  not 
explicitly reduce the gains from GM crops due to the price of seeds. Therefore the gains 
presented here include the returns to the developers and adopting producers together. 
For India, our results are much larger than the ones in other studies. The difference may 
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we impose factor-biased productivity shocks with large efficiency gains in certain critical 
sectors, our results may be different from the imposition of a Hicks-neutral 5% shock 
with GM rice. Moreover, as we combine the effects of different traits, the total effect of 
GM rice in our model is quite large compared to only Bt rice or drought resistant rice. 
Hareau  et  al.  (2005)  also  differentiate  traits  but  they  do  not  impose  a  shock  on  the 
chemical or labor factor for Bt rice.  
Despite the differences with previous studies, we believe that our results are likely 
to be robust for India, in particular because they rely on primary and secondary data on 
productivity  potential  rather  than  generalized  parameters.  Still,  like  any  ex-ante 
simulation exercise, the results depend on the assumptions of the model and scenarios. 
One of the critical factors is the yield effect. To verify the validity of the results we ran 
four sets of additional simulations (for scenarios 1, 2a, 3a-i and 3a-ii) using the minimum 
and maximum values for yields in India presented in Table 2. The results are shown in 
Table A6 in the Appendix. As expected, the welfare effects are consistently lower for 
India with the minimum yield effects than with the most likely yield effects. The welfare 
effects are also consistently larger for India with maximum yield gains, which means 
that the price decline with this higher rice production is still compensated by larger 
gains for India overall. At the same time, the relative differences across scenarios are 
proportionally  similar  to  the  ones  with  most  likely  gains.  India  gains  most  under 
scenario 1 and least under scenario 2a, and segregation of non-GM rice compensates for 
the small reduction in gains with rice trade bans.  
 
Table 10: Welfare Gains per percent Actual Adoption 
 of GM Rice in each Scenario ($ million) 
SET  Country  1  2a  2b  3a-i  3a-ii  3b-i  3b-ii 
C  China  57.9  57.6  57.8  57.7  57.7  57.8  57.8 
I  India  45.5  45.2  45.4  45.4  45.3  45.4  45.4 
CI 
China  57.9  57.6  57.8  57.8  57.7  57.9  57.8 
India  45.4  45.2  45.3  45.3  45.3  45.4  45.4 
Source: Authors‘ derivations 
A second critical factor is the adoption rate. To provide a consistent idea of the 
welfare gains experienced by the countries in our study, we divided the total annual real 
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million dollars per year per percentage of adoption in Table 10. We find that the gains 
are fairly homogeneous across scenarios. China gains just under $58 million for each 
percentage point of Bt rice in total rice production, while India gains above $45 million 
for each percentage point of the GM rice with our combination of traits. The difference 
between the two countries is mainly due to the total value of rice production and in the 
assumptions we made in the two countries. In any case, these result show that GM rice 
would be largely beneficial even at a lower adoption rate. 
Conclusions 
Many developing countries have delayed the adoption of GM crops for fear of losing 
export markets in the EU and other countries with stringent regulations on the approval 
and marketing of GM food. Yet, previous trade studies have shown that despite the 
presence of these importing countries´ regulations, the production of relevant GM crops 
in  developing  countries  is  still  expected  to  provide  significant  net  welfare  gains 
(Anderson and Jackson, 2005).  
In this paper we study the potential effects of introducing GM rice in India with or 
without China. We focus on four types of GM rice resistant to biotic and abiotic stresses, 
such as drought resistant rice and use a multi-country, CGE model to simulate their 
introduction  in  India.  We  build  on  previous  international  simulation  models  by 
improving  the  representation  of  the  productivity  shocks  with  GM  rice  taking  into 
account regional and land type disparities and by using an updated representation of 
the world market, accounting for the short run and long run effects of import approval 
and  labeling  policies  in  sensitive  countries.  We  also  allow  for  the  possibility  of 
segregation for non-GM rice products going towards sensitive importing countries.  
First, the results of our simulations show that the gains associated with the partial 
adoption  of  our  combination  of  traits  for  GM  rice  in  India  are  quite  significant, 
accounting for about 0.9% of total real income or over $3.2 billion annually. Our results 
show that a 1% increase in the adoption of GM rice in India, combining different traits in 
different regions, would result in total welfare gains exceeding $45 million per year, 
with or without trade blocks in sensitive countries. Similarly, using the assumptions 
made by Huang et al. (2004), we find that a 1% increase in Bt rice in China would result 
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Second, we find that these results largely exceed any type of potential trade losses 
for India. In India like in China, with GM rice, even at partial adoption rates, the losses 
with trade restrictions does not exceed 0.6% of the total gains with GM rice adoption. 
Provided it is adopted, GM rice would also result in large production increases, which 
could  result  in  relative  welfare  gains  in  countries  of  Sub-Saharan  Africa  or  rice 
importing countries of Asia. At the same time, we find that segregation can help reduce 
a significant share of the potential welfare gain reductions due to trade losses for GM 
rice adopters that want to keep export opportunities in sensitive countries. Our results 
also show that the opportunity cost of segregation for non-GM rice is much larger for 
sensitive importing countries than exporting countries adopting GM rice. This suggests 
that importers will likely have the incentive to invest into segregation chains for non-
GM supplies to mitigate their expected losses due to the introduction of GM crops in 
exporting countries.  
Therefore, our results demonstrate that some of the perceived trade losses related to 
the use of GM rice, a major food crop in Asia are exaggerated in the current market 
situation.  It  is  certain  that  trade  barriers  could  multiply  with  the  adoption  of  trade 
distorting regulations in a larger set of countries. For instance, India is exporting more 
rice towards North African and the Middle East than towards Europe, and some of these 
countries could decide to enforce strict import policies. But a large share of the economic 
losses with these possible restrictions would likely incur in these particular countries. 
Still,  in  the  current  regulatory  environment,  where  enforced  regulations  are 
concentrated  in  a  few  importers,  India  and  China  are  bound  to  largely  gain  from 
adopting GM rice. Because India and China have very large population bases with high 
consumption  rates,  any  increase  in  rice  productivity  will  most  likely  overcome  any 
potential trade losses.  
Third, we find that there is no significant first mover-advantage for GM rice in India 
and  China  even  if  India  would  be  slightly  better  off  leading  than  following  on  the 
adoption of GM rice. China and India would gain as much by adopting GM rice if the 
other adopts it than if it does not. At the same time, India might incur small losses if 
China  adopts  GM  rice  at  a  significant  level,  because  of  its  potential  loss  in 
competitiveness, while China would not lose and would potentially gain a little if it 
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(e.g., with weighted average of yield effects from different data sources), it is possible 
that India would be better off leading in technology adoption, but our results are not 
sufficient to warrant that conclusion. Still, our main conclusion is that China and India 
would largely gain from GM rice adoption, even when faced with trade restrictions in 
sensitive countries. China faces even less potential economic risk than India, and should 
be encouraged to move ahead, given its technology edge in GM rice. Such a move would 
clearly encourage India to follow, provided GM rice can be approved by its biosafety 
authorities.  
Even if our simulations are based on improvements in assumptions and scenarios, 
they are still subject to a number of limitations. First, like in any ex-ante simulation, the 
productivity  effects  are  still  largely  uncertain  and  their  level  affects  the  results 
significantly. A sensitivity analysis on the yield factors showed that larger yield gains 
result in higher welfare gains, but that the losses with trade remain relatively small 
compared to the gains with GM technology. More sensitivity analysis, particularly on 
the input factors would help to provide a more complete picture of the range of possible 
effects  of  GM  rice  in  India.  Second,  our  simulation would  gain  by  using  a  dynamic 
rather  than  comparative  static  framework.  Local  expert  meetings  and  elicitation 
provided some insight into the potential evolution of adoption in India. Accounting for 
the crop/trait specific regulatory lag, extension lags and adoption dynamics would help 
improve  the  plausibility  of  our  results  and  allow  us  to  introduce  more  strategic 
considerations. If not, the use of a more recent representation of the economy would at 
least  provide  a  better  overview  of  the  situation.  Third,  despite  our  effort  to  reduce 
potential biases linked to the over-aggregation of the GTAP database with the use of 
proportional factors for agricultural chemical, our model would be better served with 
structural differentiation within the chemical sector.  
More  generally,  it  is  necessary  to  keep  in  mind  that  the  results  of  our  global 
simulations, like the ones of other papers, do not account for the positive or negative 
effects of technology adoption on the environment and other potential externalities they 
may generate on other activities of the economy. On the one hand, the reduction of 
chemical inputs may provide benefit for farmers‘ health and/or the environment, on the 
other hand, secondary or non-target pest resistance building may affect other types of 
crop production and potential gene flows could affect natural biodiversity. Our implicit Gruère et al.         Chap.14: Genetically Modified Rice     329      
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assumption throughout the chapter is that the varieties of GM rice we consider are only 
released after assessment and approval by the biosafety regulatory authorities in India 
and  China,  on  the  conclusion  that  their  potential  risks  are  negligible  or  at  least 
manageable under particular practices. Naturally any possible external costs incurred in 
adopting countries would have to be compared with the large expected income gains we 
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Appendix: Additional Tables  
 
  Table A1: Decomposition of the Welfare Gains for Scenario 1 under each Set  
(% of total real income) 









China  0.60  0.04  0.03  0.53 
India  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
I 
China  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
India  0.88  0.14  -0.01  0.74 
CI 
China  0.60  0.04  0.03  0.53 
India  0.87  0.14  -0.01  0.75 
Source: Results from simulations 
 
Table A2: % Change in Average World Price of Rice 
 Under Different Scenarios 
Scenario  China  India  India + China 
1  -0.634  -0.826  -1.502 
2a  -0.383  -0.665  -1.067 
2b  -0.587  -0.797  -1.423 
3a-i  -0.568  -0.811  -1.419 
3a-ii  -0.520  -0.764  -1.348 
3b-i  -0.634  -0.831  -1.504 
3b-ii  -0.597  -0.792  -1.453 
Source: Results from simulations. 
 
Table A3: % Changes in Production, Export and Import Volumes of Rice for Set C 
Scenarios in Selected Countries 
Country  % change in   1  2a  2b  3a-i  3a-ii  3b-i  3b-ii 
China  Production  20.1  18.2  19.9  18.9  18.8  19.9  19.9 
  Exports  27.3  -11.7  13.7  56.7  41.0  36.9  23.6 
  Imports  -46.9  -47.6  -47.1  -47.3  -47.3  -47.0  -47.1 
India  Production  -0.4  0.0  -0.4  -0.2  -0.6  -0.4  -0.8 
  Exports  -5.7  -1.9  -4.7  -3.6  -7.7  -5.1  -9.0 
  Imports  -1.3  -1.9  -1.3  -1.6  -1.9  -1.3  -1.5 
Japan  Production  -2.1  1.8  -1.5  0.0  0.4  -1.7  -1.5 
  Exports  -2.8  -4.2  -3.0  -3.6  -3.7  -2.9  -2.9 
  Imports  -4.2  0.7  -2.9  11.7  8.8  1.4  -1.5 
EU  Production  -6.8  5.4  -5.9  0.0  2.6  -6.3  -4.5 
  Exports  -5.0  -5.5  -3.7  -5.5  -5.9  -4.3  -4.6 
  Imports  -7.1  3.8  -4.8  8.2  3.8  -2.7  -7.4 
Rest of Asia  Production  -1.7  -1.1  -1.6  -1.4  -1.3  -1.6  -1.6 
  Exports  -8.5  -6.4  -7.8  -7.4  -7.0  -8.1  -7.8 
  Imports  -1.9  -3.2  -2.1  -2.7  -2.7  -2.0  -2.0 
Source: Results from simulations 
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Table A4: % Changes in Production, Export and Import Volumes of Rice for Set I 
Scenarios in Selected Countries 
Country  % change in  1  2a  2b  3a-i  3a-ii  3b-i  3b-ii 
China  Production  -0.1  0.0  -0.1  -0.1  -0.3  -0.1  -0.3 
  Exports  -5.8  -4.9  -4.9  -4.3  -11.3  -5.4  -12.3 
  Imports  1.0  0.9  1.0  0.9  0.8  1.0  0.8 
India  Production  21.0  17.0  20.8  19.0  18.6  20.9  20.7 
  Exports  26.1  17.7  17.7  39.3  31.3  30.5  23.1 
  Imports  -50.7  -50.9  -50.9  -50.9  -51.0  -50.8  -50.8 
Japan  Production  -0.3  -0.1  -0.2  -0.2  0.2  -0.2  0.2 
  Exports  -2.5  -2.4  -2.4  -2.3  -2.5  -2.4  -2.6 
  Imports  0.4  0.9  0.3  0.9  -2.1  0.6  -2.4 
EU  Production  -7.1  6.5  -6.1  -1.2  1.6  -6.6  -4.6 
  Exports  -5.8  -5.6  -5.6  -7.3  -7.7  -5.7  -6.0 
  Imports  -4.7  11.8  -5.0  11.8  7.0  0.1  -5.1 
Rest of Asia  Production  -1.2  -0.9  -1.2  -1.1  -1.0  -1.2  -1.1 
  Exports  -7.3  -6.8  -6.8  -6.5  -6.1  -7.0  -6.7 
  Imports  -1.6  -1.5  -1.5  -1.5  -1.6  -1.6  -1.7 
Source: Results from simulations 
 
 
Table A5: % Changes in Production, Export and Import Volumes of Rice for Set CI 
Scenarios in Selected Countries 
Country  % change in  1  2a  2b  3a-i  3a-ii  3b-i  3b-ii 
China  Production  19.8  18.0  19.6  18.8  18.6  19.7  19.6 
  Exports  20.6  7.6  7.6  51.4  35.8  30.5  17.6 
  Imports  -46.4  -46.6  -46.6  -46.8  -46.9  -46.5  -46.6 
India  Production  20.2  16.6  20.0  18.7  18.2  20.1  19.9 
  Exports  19.7  12.1  12.1  35.4  27.3  24.7  17.6 
  Imports  -51.3  -51.5  -51.5  -51.7  -51.8  -51.4  -51.4 
Japan  Production  -2.3  1.7  -1.7  -0.1  0.2  -2.0  -1.7 
  Exports  -5.1  -5.1  -5.1  -5.7  -5.8  -5.1  -5.2 
  Imports  -3.7  -2.5  -2.5  12.7  9.8  2.1  -0.8 
EU  Production  -12.7  13.3  -10.9  -1.2  1.5  -11.9  -10.5 
  Exports  -10.4  -8.8  -8.8  -12.0  -12.3  -9.6  -9.8 
  Imports  -9.8  -8.9  -8.9  21.9  16.8  -0.7  -6.1 
Rest of Asia  Production  -2.8  -1.8  -2.7  -2.4  -2.3  -2.7  -2.7 
  Exports  -15.1  -14.0  -14.0  -13.4  -13.0  -14.6  -14.3 
  Imports  -3.3  -3.4  -3.4  -4.0  -4.1  -3.4  -3.4 
Source: Results from simulations 
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Table A6:  Change in Welfare Effects with GM Rice Adoption in India and China, under Minimum, Most Likely and Maximum 
Yield Effects for India in the Case of Selected Scenarios ($ million/year)   
Set CI 
1. Productivity shock  2a. Import ban, no segregation  3a-i. Import ban, costless 
segregation 
3a-ii. Import ban, 5% 
segregation cost 
Region  Minimum 
Most 
likely  Maximum  Minimum 
Most  
likely  Maximum  Minimum 
Most 
 likely  Maximum Minimum 
Most 
likely  Maximum 
Australia and NZ  -4.624  -4.959  -5.280  -3.082  -3.528  -3.963  -3.903  -4.276  -4.616  -3.763  -4.151  -4.512 
China  4633.076  4633.467  4633.918  4609.292  4609.906  4610.572  4619.637 
4620.24
0  4620.903  4617.649 4618.276  4618.966 
Japan  462.008  472.340  483.624  -294.727  -288.651  -282.297  46.955  56.301  67.048  -20.450  -11.778  -1.929 
South Korea  175.953  178.413  181.170  -157.071  -155.699  -154.217  10.187  12.564  15.419  -20.836  -18.638  -16.022 
Rest of Asia  5.346  1.535  -1.509  10.523  7.360  4.956  7.138  3.275  0.023  7.730  3.962  0.816 
Indonesia  6.677  8.500  10.354  7.343  9.222  11.138  6.997  8.828  10.679  7.063  8.902  10.763 
Philippines  5.079  5.656  6.255  3.936  4.481  5.045  4.503  5.081  5.685  4.395  4.968  5.567 
Bangladesh  2.407  3.382  4.436  2.656  3.701  4.826  2.500  3.482  4.527  2.527  3.519  4.576 
India  2287.077  3258.841  4200.295  2272.197  3240.650  4178.408  2280.720 
3251.96
4  4193.407  2279.559 3250.333  4191.185 
Canada  7.820  8.600  9.453  8.328  9.141  10.027  8.058  8.838  9.683  8.107  8.892  9.742 
United States  87.591  95.934  104.467  85.323  93.177  101.220  86.563  94.832  103.374  86.324  94.521  102.980 
Mexico  4.193  4.630  5.119  3.343  3.751  4.209  3.764  4.199  4.690  3.683  4.113  4.600 
Rest of L. America  28.715  28.646  28.593  33.126  33.228  33.346  30.782  30.680  30.548  31.224  31.146  31.042 
Argentina  -1.020  -1.495  -1.986  -0.745  -1.215  -1.701  -0.880  -1.355  -1.847  -0.851  -1.326  -1.817 
Brazil  -0.629  -0.849  -1.076  -0.282  -0.472  -0.668  -0.449  -0.664  -0.892  -0.415  -0.626  -0.848 
European Union  273.696  307.302  343.115  -69.058  -57.166  -44.103  100.990 132.836  171.042  66.467  95.083  129.370 
Rest of Europe  32.081  34.453  37.138  11.009  12.609  14.473  20.478  22.683  25.334  18.552  20.641  23.144 
N. Africa and M. 
East  76.043  97.697  119.926  76.151  98.229  120.912  75.875  97.591  119.797  75.901  97.676  119.954 
Rest of S-S Africa  63.554  72.242  81.054  62.989  71.811  80.781  63.157  71.872  80.690  63.112  71.844  80.686 
South Africa  9.115  12.611  16.037  8.944  12.464  15.916  9.026  12.529  15.955  9.011  12.517  15.948 
Tanzania and 
Uganda  1.166  1.482  1.805  1.143  1.468  1.801  1.147  1.465  1.788  1.146  1.465  1.789 
World  8155.321  9218.428  10256.905  6671.335  7704.465  8710.683  7373.246 
8432.96
4  9473.238 
7236.13
4  8291.338  9325.999 
Source: Results from simulations 